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Abstract: Hollywood Korean War films primarily aimed at integrating American citi-
zenry into national narratives of cohesion and teleology by displacing contradictions 
onto the exteriority of American identity. The films dismiss the Korean War as not 
worth fighting for, yet simultaneously propose that fighting is the only viable option to 
cope with the futility of war. This paper argues that this closed rationality of we-fight-
simply-because-we-fight is a symptom of cold war liberalism. And the cold war sub-
ject, caught in the circular movement of finding-while-missing the meaning, prefigures 
a postmodern subject of drive that transcends the fundamental lack in the process of 
subjectivization and finds satisfaction in the endless circular movement with no desti-
nation. Crucially, American exceptionalism functions as the state fantasy in this pro-
cess of denying/displacing inconsistencies inherent to the imagined national identity. 
This circular rationality, which constitutes the paradigmatic subject-position of late-
capitalist American culture, was constructed in the early years of the cold war, and 
its cultural manifestations can be traced in Hollywood films about the Korean War.
Keywords: Hollywood Korean War Films, Cold War Liberalism, American Exception-
alism, Post-Cold War World Order, Iraq War Films
Representing war as a spectacle is a familiar story in the Hollywood film 
industry. War itself as the dominant narrative frame often serves as a theat-
rical backdrop for the other submerged frame of sensorial affect that reso-
nates with contemporary culture and a certain type of American subjectiv-
ity. Threading Hollywood war films from World War I to the Iraq War is the 
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figure of the “American soldier,” embodying the collective sensibilities of 
respective wars. Out of the “Doughboys,” lumped together with no indi-
viduality in the horrendous trench warfare of the First World War, emerged 
Audie Murphy and John Wayne as the icons of American heroism, fighting 
in the Manichean moral universe of the Second World War where America 
was assumed unambiguously on the right side. Wayne, in particular, epito-
mizes the changes in cultural sentiments from moral confidence to uncer-
tainty characteristic of the Vietnam War. The icon of a “perfect” American 
soldier in Sands of Iwo Jima (Allan Dwan, 1949)—no-nonsense, compe-
tent, and gritty in his moral resolve—was transposed into that of  “a badly 
cleaned-up myth” of America’s self-image—“bull-headed, unthinking and 
hyper-patriotic”—in The Green Berets (Ray Kellogg, 1968), anticipating 
John Rambo to rummage the badly damaged myth of heroic American 
manhood.1 Soldiers in current Iraq War films generally refer back to the 
grunts and veterans of Vietnam rather than the unproblematic heroes of the 
World Wars. They are foot soldiers cynical about war’s premises and fre-
quently suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Notably, the 
transition from the hero to the grunt is marked by a gap, a jump from World 
War II to Vietnam, glossing over Korea, yet it was in fact the Korean War 
films that set a precedent in cinematic conventions not only for Vietnam but 
also for recent Iraq War films.
It is curious why Korea is routinely eclipsed in America’s cultural mem-
ory of its numerous wars abroad. The war (1950-1953) caused a heavy toll 
of lives with more than two million Korean civilians estimated dead, more 
than a million Chinese soldiers killed, about 37,000 US servicemen killed 
or missing, and more than twelve percent of North Korean population lost.2 
Nevertheless, the Korean War is usually dubbed “the Forgotten War,” or 
rather it is remembered as forgotten—the naming that inadvertently reveals 
the structuring of official memory upon what has been silenced. In fact, as 
Paul M. Edwards says, the war has been “identified in so many ways that 
it is possible to argue that it has never been identified at all”: it was called 
1 Martin Barker, A ‘Toxic Genre’: The Iraq War Films (London: Pluto, 2011), 45-68. 
2 For genocidal aspects of the Korean War, see Dong-choon Kim, “Forgotten War, Forgotten Massacres: The 
Korean War (1950-1953)  as Licensed Mass Killings,” Journal of Genocide Research 6.4 (2004): 523-544; 
and “The War Against the ‘Enemy Within’: Hidden Massacres in the Early Stages of the Korean War,” Re-
thinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience, ed. Gi-Wook 
Shin, Soon-Won Park, and Daqing Yang (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 75-93.
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the “forgotten war,” “the war nobody wanted,” “Mr. Truman’s folly,” the 
“wrong war,” the “Communist war,” the “Asian war,” the “unknown war,” 
the “emphatic war,” the “war that never was,” the “war before Vietnam,” 
and Edwards himself suggests, “the ignored war.”3 Most of these are epi-
thets of negation, betraying certain subconscious acknowledgement of con-
tradiction in the naming of the war. Edwards suggests that it was the lack 
of a name—a “nonwar” definition that paradoxically enabled the war: by 
identifying America’s military involvement in Korea as a “police action,” 
President Truman was able to deploy US troops to Korea without the ap-
proval of Congress and without declaring war.4 Hence, the Korean War was 
a war and at the same time not a war whose historicity is made visible by 
virtue of being invisible, present in its marked erasure. 
This paradoxical denial-as-acknowledgement is in fact symptomatic of 
contradictions in identifying the Korean War. It was an international war 
involving China, Russia, the United States and UN forces comprised of 
sixteen nations while simultaneously it was a civil war, a national libera-
tion war, and a war of reunification for Korea, which was divided in 1945 
as part of post-World War II settlements between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. As a “proxy war” consolidating the cold war, it was hailed 
in America as a “good war” to defend “free” society, but soon it turned 
into an “ugly war” where Korean civilians were held hostage by porous 
boundaries between friend and enemy. Part and parcel of the global cold 
war, the Korean War was represented as a moral crusade for the contain-
ment of communist threats, but it was also an imperialist war of integrating 
Asia into the sphere of American interests.5 Built upon a bipolar system, the 
cold war was about containing the communist alternative system on the one 
hand, and integrating, economically and ideologically, the so-called “free 
world” into a US-centered free-trade world system on the other hand. The 
official policy of containment was primarily expressed by militarization. 
The Korean War procured the United States a political economic rationale 
to implement NSC-68 and to grant a fourfold increase of military budget, 
3 Paul M. Edwards, To Acknowledge a War: The Korean War in American Memory (Westport, CT: Green-
wood P, 2000), 28. 
4 Ibid., 29.
5 For Cold War history in detailed relation to the Korean War, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean 
War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, vol. 1, 1981 and The Origins of the 
Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950, vol. 2, 1990 (Seoul: Yeoksabipyeongsa, 2002).
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thereby inaugurating an era of the military-industrial complex. Integration 
appears on the cultural arena in diverse rhetorical shapes and ideological 
persuasions geared to win the hearts and minds of not only Americans but 
also global citizens.6
Hollywood war films provide a particularly interesting insight into the 
cultural terrain where popular sensibilities are probed and national subjec-
tivities forged. As illustrated in its history of “conversion”7 to propaganda 
films during the Second World War, the motion picture industry has been 
directly involved with politics, translating official policy into popular lan-
guage. In modern technological society, the film industry can serve espe-
cially well as a propaganda machine since it can produce incessantly and in 
mass quantities “regular emotional replenishment” as a means to keep peo-
ple at work.8Hollywood war movies, in particular, traditionally function as 
“integration propaganda,” producing “desired values,” resolving “approved 
contradictions” in the United States, and explaining war as “a painful, often 
terrible, ultimately rewarding event.”9
In this vein, Korean War films are also primarily concerned with preserv-
ing the desired self-image of America by theatrically staging and resolv-
ing contradictions against the backdrop of the war. More specifically, they 
portray the American national subject as the embodiment of neo-Wilsonian 
liberalism who would spread democracy to the world and, coupling free-
dom with national expansion, construct Jeffersonian “empire of liberty.”10 
6 For histories of the cold war, see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996, 8th ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997); Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds. Origins of the Cold War: 
An International History (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); and Thomas McCormick, America’s 
Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1989). 
For cultural studies on Cold War politics of containment and integration, see Christina Klein, Cold War 
Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: U of California P, 2003); Melani 
McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000 (Berkeley: 
U of California P, 2001); and Leerom Medovoi, Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity (Dur-
ham and London: Duke UP, 2005).
7 Thomas Schatz, “World War II and the Hollywood ‘War Film,’” Refiguring American Film Genres: His-
tory and Theory, ed. Nick Browne (Berkeley: U of California P, 1998), 89-128. He discusses some rep-
resentative World War II war movies as well as the historical context of the Hollywood’s conversion to 
the war production. He sees Casablanca (1942) as an exemplary “conversion narrative” signaling the 
American conversion from neutrality to “selfless sacrifice.”
8 Tim Blackmore, “Eyeless in America: Hollywood and Indiewood’s Iraq War on Film,” Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society 32.4 (2012): 295. 
9 Ibid., 296.
10 Giles Gunn, “Introduction: The Place of Culture in the Play of International Politics,” America and the 
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In doing so, these films avoid dealing with problems of the war, relegating 
instead those sites of war to an exteriority of American identity: that is, 
containing contradictions by projecting them upon the Enemy/Other while 
integrating America’s idealized subjects into nationalist narratives of cohe-
sion and teleology. 
The Perversion of Cold War Liberalism
Hollywood produced about fifty films on Korea from 1951 with Samuel 
Fuller’s The Steel Helmet to 1963 when Vietnam took the American pub-
lic’s foremost attention.11 Most of them were made at the height of anti-
communist hysteria, coinciding for example with McCarthyism and the 
Rosenberg Trial and inevitably resonating with dominant cold war ideolo-
gies and popular sensibilities. These films routinely dismiss the war in Ko-
rea as unworthy, but through a curious twist of reasoning, they simultane-
ously propose fighting it as the only viable option to cope with the futility of 
war, affirming in effect the state’s war policy and bypassing the discussion 
of its problems. The circular logic of we-fight-simply-because-we-fight is 
analogous to the contradictory denial-as-acknowledgement of the war it-
self. In this loop of pervert repetition, the logical gap is closed, disavowing 
the war as meaningless, yet sparing the American audience the agency as 
autonomous individuals who would make a conscious “choice” to fight. 
The closed rationality is a symptom of the idiosyncratic cultural terrain of 
the cold war—a way to Americanize the Manichean universe in order to 
preserve the mythic landscape of the national imaginary. In other words, 
it marks a cold war brand of Wilsonian liberalism or America’s claim that 
it has “not only the power but the right to transform the world into a more 
perfect place: that is, one more resembling itself.”12 Such contradictions in 
cold war liberalism constitute the principal thematic concerns of many Ko-
rean War films. The heroes are typically caught in the circular movement of 
finding-while-missing the meaning, affirming the war in the process itself. 
Misshaping of a New World Order, ed. Giles Gunn and Carl Gutierrez-Jones (Berkeley: U of California 
P, 2010), 11.
11 For a filmography of the Korean War-related movies, see Robert J. Lentz, Korean War Filmography: 91 
English Language Features through 2000 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003); Paul M. Edwards, A Guide to 
Films on the Korean War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997).
12 Ronald Steel, “America’s Mission,” America and the Misshaping of a New World Order, ed. Giles Gunn 
and Carl Gutierrez-Jones (Berkeley: U of California P, 2010), 36.
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Cold war liberalism is, according to Thomas Hill Schaub and Donald E. 
Pease, marked by a series of inversions in its reasoning. The postwar “new 
liberalism” was formulated as “psychological realism” in opposition to social 
realism and naturalism of the 1930s Cultural Front by dismissing social real-
ity as “totalitarian” and re-defining individual consciousness as truly “real.”13 
Inverting the definition of “reality,” cold war liberals also labeled any atti-
tudes towards Realpolitik as pathological symptoms of a “Cold War mental-
ity” while resorting instead to a “Cultural Imaginary” as a legitimate reser-
voir of political energies and counter-cultural possibilities.14 In short, cold 
war liberalism inverted reality as delusional/ irreal and proposed the inner 
realm of individual psyche as an alternative space of the genuine/the real, de-
politicizing the public sphere by abducting it into a-historical and a-political 
psychic realms. This logical inversion explains the cold war phenomenon of 
conformity since it rationalizes one’s failure to make a self-conscious choice 
without damaging a sense of autonomy. The well-known dissenters in “gray 
flannel suits” of the 1950s willingly complied with the violation of their civic 
rights under the National Security State because the real freedom meant for 
them “only the inner freedom ‘to choose whether to conform or not.’”15
Of course, this choice is not really a choice because choosing “noncon-
formity for its own sake would be perverse and ‘anomic,’”16 and as it turns 
out, they had no other freedom of choice than conformity itself. Since no 
one is openly “for” communism, the only real choice is “against” it. As 
Slavoj Žižek puts in relation to the current war against terrorism, “precisely 
in such moments of apparent clarity of choice, mystification is total.”17
The cold war subject, moreover, prefigures a postmodern subject, char-
acterized among others by the transition from desire to drive.18 The modern 
13 Thomas Hill Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War (Madison: The U of Wisconsin P, 1991), 3-49.
14 Donald E. Pease, “Leslie Fiedler, the Rosenberg Trial, and the Formulation of an American Canon,” 
Boundary 2 17.2 (Summer 1990): 155-198.
15 Barbara Ehrenreich, The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment (New York: 
Anchor/Doubleday, 1983), 40.
16 Ibid.
17 Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real!: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates (London 
and New York: Verso, 2002), 54.
18 By “postmodern,” I mean the condition which Fredric Jameson refers to as a “breakdown of the signify-
ing chain,” where the subject is severed from the symbolic field. The condition of postmodernity is one 
in which modern master narratives have been “deconstructed to the point of losing their entire symbolic 
weight in the meaning-making practices of subjects in the social world.” See Matthew Flisfeder, “Subject 
of Desire/Subject of Drive: The Emergence of Žižekian Media Studies,” Reviews in Cultural Theory 3.1 
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subject of desire is condemned to the state of non-satisfaction because the 
gap is inherent to subjectivization and the object attained is never it, the 
thing desired: “[Desire’s] most elementary and ultimate aim is to sustain 
itself as desire, in its state of non-satisfaction.”19 The postmodern subject 
of drive, however, finds satisfaction in constantly missing the goal and is 
released from having to strive for it since for him the gap is closed now: 
Drive, on the other hand, stands for the paradoxical possibility that the subject, forever 
prevented from achieving his Goal (and thus fully satisfying his desire), can neverthe-
less find satisfaction in the very circular movement of repeatedly missing its object, of 
circulating around it: the gap constitutive of desire is thus closed; the self-enclosed loop 
of a circular repetitive movement replaces infinite striving.20
Unlike the subject of desire who remains “sutured” and becomes ever more 
conscious of the reigning conditions of failed satisfaction, the subject of 
drive is emancipated from the signifying chain and from the weight of 
meaning-making practices in the social world. In a similar vein, for the 
subject of desire, “there is choice—inclusive of the fundamental forced 
choice—that is, the subject chooses”; but at the level of drive, the act of 
choice is inverted into “making-oneself-chosen”: 
[A]s in predestination, in which the religious subject does not simply choose God, but 
“makes himself chosen” by Him. Or—to put it another way—the only—but crucial and 
highest—freedom I am granted in drive is the freedom to choose the inevitable, freely to 
embrace my Destiny, what will happen to me in any case.21 (italics added)
The subject of desire chooses, making a conscious choice in the field of 
contentious meanings, whereas the subject of drive makes his choice as 
(2012): 26.
19 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (1999. London and New York: 
Verso, 2008), 359-360. 
20 Ibid. For an explication of the passage, see also Flisfeder 26: “Desire involves the endless, metonymical 
search for the (impossible) object (objet petit a) that will wrest, and satisfy desire itself. But desire is self-
reflexive and is, by definition, insatiable. It continues to follow along a cycle in which the object attained 
is never it, the thing that is desired. This constant search for the object produces a surplus-enjoyment: there 
is an unconscious satisfaction in being able to reset the co-ordinates of desire, continuing the search. Drive 
speaks to this other side of insatiable desire. Drive achieves enjoyment by failing to get the object–it is 
the enjoyment of failure. Desire attaches the subject ever more aggressively to the reigning conditions of 
domination and exploitation, while drive moves the subject in the direction of emancipation and the ends 
of analysis.”
21 Žižek, Ticklish Subject 362. 
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something inevitable, thereby inverting “choosing” into “making-himself-
chosen” and thus exempting himself from any responsibility for his act. In 
this way, the cold war non-choice is reversed into a choice, allowing the 
subject a sense of agency while releasing him from the weight of his action.
Reflecting such cultural sensibilities, characters in Korean War films 
seem caught in the circular reasoning in their search for the meaning of 
their place in the war. In willingly choosing what seems inevitable, they 
resemble the cold war subject of drive exercising the “higher freedom” of 
self-conscious submission22 to the mandates of the National Security State. 
Moreover, what made this cold war subject of drive particularly American 
is the work of state fantasy. According to Pease, it is the state fantasy of 
American exceptionalism that helps the national subject to disavow the gap 
in the desired national image or the national Thing. The fantasy of excep-
tionalism supplies its adherents the “psychosocial structures” of disavowal 
that allow them to ignore the inconsistencies or “the state’s exceptions” to 
the national Thing.23 Since the national Thing causes the subject to desire 
it, but it is unattainable, fantasy brings in the national Other to explain the 
national Thing’s failure to come about and to endow the national Thing 
with “ontological consistency.”24
American fantasy of exceptionalism helped to hold the imagined nation-
al community together throughout the cold war by attributing this failure to 
the Enemy of the State. Moreover, the state fantasy enabled US citizens to 
disavow inconsistencies as “exceptions” required to counteract the Soviet 
threat. In other words, American exceptionalism allowed US citizens to 
construct the image of the Soviet Empire as “the threat” to the attainment of 
the national ideal and at the same time to construe American imperialism as 
“a nation-preserving measure that would prevent Soviet imperialism,” thus 
as “an exception to US national identity that proved its rule.”25
As such, the state fantasy provided US citizens with a psychosocial struc-
ture which enabled them to imagine themselves as agents rather than victims 
22 Ehrenreich 40.
23 Donald E. Pease, The New American Exceptionalism (Minneapolis & London: U of Minnesota P, 2009), 
12. According to Pease, the national Thing is the object cause of desire, “that which the national subject 
desires” and simultaneously “that which causes the subject’s desire” (17). In this case, it is the idea of 
American exceptionalism that American people believe as their national ideal and that simultaneously 
cause them to want it as such.
24 Ibid., 18.
25 Ibid., 20-21.
69“I’VE GOT A HUNCH WE’RE GOING AROUND IN CIRCLES”
of the cold war National Security State, willingly ceding their civic rights 
by identifying themselves with the state’s will.26 With American people’s 
consent, the cold war emergency state was able to render the political do-
main into a biopolitical settlement which endowed the state with power over 
life and death of the population. In our (supposedly) post-ideological and 
post-political era, “we are all ‘excluded’” as the “object of biopolitics” and 
reduced to administered and regulated “mere life.”27 Significantly, the cold 
war continues into our post-cold war world. In recent war against terror-
ism, President George W. Bush’s declaration of a State of Exception under 
Homeland Security Act reminds us of the cold war National Security State, 
with which US citizens identified themselves as enactors of state policies and 
consented to the suspension of their own civic rights. They also espoused the 
fantasy of exceptionalism by relegating US imperial practices as exceptions 
to the national identity by willfully misrepresenting the occupation of Af-
ghanistan and Iraq now, and South Korea and West Berlin back then, not as 
violations of but as necessary means to preserve that imagined ideal.
The American liberal subject remains caught in the circular rationality in 
ignoring inconsistencies in the national Thing and projecting them onto the 
national Other—the figure of Enemy from the communist to Islamic fun-
damentalist, and from the Evil Empire to the “network” of terrorists. Here, 
“the Enemy serves as the ‘quilting point’ (the Lacanian point de capiton) of 
our ideological space” while “terror”—just as well as “communism”—be-
comes the universal signifier, “gradually elevated into the hidden universal 
equivalent of all social evils.”28
Lost in the Fog of War: Hollywood Korean War Films
As a cultural mediator between political imperatives and popular senti-
ments, Hollywood war movies are often constructed around the central 
narrative concern of how to configure national coherence and legitimate 
26 Pease argues: “Rather than protesting against the state’s abrogation of its rules, U.S. citizens fantasized 
themselves as the sovereign power that had suspended the law in the name of securing the nation.” Pease, 
New American Exceptionalism 33. 
27 Žižek, Welcome to the Desert 95-100. Under the modern regime of biopolitics, the state of exception is 
made the permanent rule of law and human life becomes “bare life,” whose life is “included in the juridi-
cal order solely in the form of its exclusion” and disposable with impunity. Giorgio Agamben, Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998), 8-9.
28 Ibid., 111.
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citizenry. The Korean War film, in particular, showcases the evolving ways 
in which American state fantasy was staged and cold war subjectivity was 
imagined. Generic conventions of the World War II combat film are re-
cycled yet with crucial variations, reflecting the shifting historical contours 
from the “good war” alliances against fascism to the cold war contentions 
over the emergent Third World. With Korea, the family ideology is rede-
ployed with a modification to envision not only national but also global, 
“free-world” citizenry. Moreover, heralding the circular logic of cold war 
liberalism, cynicism pervades the general sentiment regarding the unpopu-
lar war, thereby facilitating the contradictory denying-while-acknowledg-
ing the war’s legitimacy. 
According to Jeanine Basinger, World War II combat films set a paradigm 
for later imagination by featuring a combat unit as a mixed group represent-
ing America as the “melting pot” of people across all ethnic, class, religious, 
and geographical backgrounds. If these films were more concerned with 
integrating white ethnic groups of Eastern and Southern European descent, 
Korean War films prominently featured African Americans and Japanese 
Americans, interpellating racial/ethnic others as part of national citizenry. 
Another characteristic she notes is a focus on the family theme concerning 
not only conflicts within American families but also Korea-US relationship 
as a metaphoric family. Women and children are frequently featured as a 
means to justify fighting the foreign war by appealing to American citizens’ 
sense of responsibility for civilians and by extension for family. Basinger 
also points out an increased cynicism as the distinct mark of Korean War 
movies. Skepticism about military leadership and a justifiable cause of war 
was captured as a lost sense of direction, epitomized in the figure of the 
“Ghost Patrol of the Korean War.”29 
Thus as “a grab bag of current ideological and social problems,”30 Kore-
an War films often intermix the combat film with family melodrama. To the 
category of more traditional combat films belong Samuel Fuller’s The Steel 
Helmet (1951) and Fixed Bayonets (1951), Pork Chop Hill (Lewis Mile-
stone, 1959) and All the Young Men (Hall Bartlett, 1960). These films deal 
with “last stand” battles of American platoons whose melting-pot group 
dynamics highlight shifting racial/ethnic boundaries in the constitution of 
29 For Korean War film conventions, see Jeanine Basinger, The World War II Combat Film: Anatomy of a 
Genre (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2003), 46, 159-167.
30 Ibid., 161.
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legitimate citizenship. The family theme is more prominently staged in I 
Want You (Mark Robson, 1951), One Minute to Zero (Tay Garnett, 1952) 
and The Bridges at Toko-Ri (Mark Robson, 1955). In these films, the trope 
of family is employed to envision a coherent America by persuading resent-
ful wives and mothers to support their conscripted husbands and sons. The 
Steel Helmet, One Minute to Zero, and Battle Hymn (Douglas Sirk, 1957) 
address Korea-US relationship more directly by featuring Koreans either as 
infiltrating enemies or as civilian refugees—women and orphaned children 
to be “adopted” by the metaphoric American “family.” Finally, The Man-
churian Candidate (John Frankenheimer, 1962), regarded as one of Ameri-
can film classics, revisits the Korean War as a fearsome site of film noir 
populated by phallic mothers, Yellow Perils, and brainwashing communists 
only to absorb them back into the imaginary family-nation.
On this cultural stage set by Korea, the fantasy of exceptionalism evolved, 
accommodating cold war politics and shaping a culture of liberal consen-
sus. The “cold war consensus” was an amalgamation of “isolationism” and 
“open door internationalism,” the opposing traditions of US foreign policy. 
It was a compromise of the two contrasting cold war “global imaginaries” 
to “contain” a “communist bloc” with political/military “bulwarks” and si-
multaneously, to “integrate” the newly liberated “third world” into a “free 
world” of the free market system.31 The dual politics of containment and in-
tegration illustrate a historically specific mode which the fantasy of excep-
tionalism adopts to reconfigure national coherence and state subjectivity. 
Containment concerns the national Other/Enemy onto which inconsisten-
cies of state fantasy are projected, and integration is another way of saying 
that US practices are “non-imperial,” merely “exceptions” to its otherwise 
exceptional national identity. 
The political task of containment policy was to provide “a recognizable 
image of the enemy” as the “quilting point” of cold war ideological space, 
and Korean War films brought to light several “faces” of the enemy, illu-
minating “a performative procedure” of “enemy recognition.”32 The figure 
of the enemy in Korea is typically represented as spectral, invisible, and 
reified—as the universal signifier of transcendental “evil.” In The Steel Hel-
met, a film about the typical “last stand” struggle of a “lost patrol,” a ragtag 
group of stragglers arrive at a deserted Buddhist temple with a statue of 
31 Klein 30-58. 
32 Žižek, Welcome to the Desert 109-111. 
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Buddha that is “more Aztec than Oriental,”33 where they set up an obser-
vation post. Soon they are followed by an unidentified spectral presence, 
looking down from the air or from behind a statue, from whose perspec-
tive the US soldiers are observed, imparting a sense of imminent/immanent 
threat. This fleeting shadow that sneaks in to murder a night guard finally 
materializes as a North Korean major hiding in the temple. The enemy in 
this way is figured almost as supernatural, dematerialized into a specter 
with indestructible power. 
Moreover, the enemy is “invisible” as the North Korean major, now 
POW, looks just like “us” or at least like “our Asian allies” such as the 
South Korean boy Short Round and the Japanese American sergeant Tana-
ka. Indeed, the blurring of friend/enemy division is one of the most noted 
characteristics of the Korean War. In the early stage of the war, the allied 
forces had to deal with the massive flood of refugees incessantly moving 
southwards, and sometimes among the refugees were hiding communist 
guerrilla fighters in civilian clothes.
This motif is frequently picked up in a number of Korean War films, 
including The Steel Helmet where two guerrilla fighters appear as snipers 
hiding in ambush and later a group of refugees are searched for hidden 
weapons. The sardonic hero Sergeant Zack (Gene Evans) mutters: “Don’t 
you want to know how to tell the difference? He’s a South Korean when 
he’s running with ya; and he’s a North Korean when he’s running after 
ya.” For US military men, the enemy was not readily identifiable not only 
because they were fighting against a rather abstract ideology of commu-
nism, but also because it was a racialist war to “stop the gooks”: “who 
‘the gooks’ were, they didn’t know, and they didn’t want to know.”34 The 
cold war “enemy-ness” was thus performatively constructed as the na-
tional Other, often racially encoded, not only threatening American men 
in a foreign war but also infiltrating the home front as communist subver-
sives collapsed with racial/social dissenters. The enemies are everywhere 
yet invisible, but who they are or why they fight is never explained; rather, 
they simply constitute a generalized background onto which “our story” 
can be projected.
33 Nora Sayre, “Unglaring Exceptions: Dissent in the Films of the 1950s,”Monthly Review 53.5 (Oct. 2001): 
42. 
34 Captain Fred Ladd, qtd. in Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Rela-
tions in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001), 81.
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The spectral/invisible body of the enemy is sometimes completely dema-
terialized into a reified fetish object itself like a set of imaginary “bridges” 
in an imaginary North Korean landscape. In The Bridges at Toko-Ri, Admi-
ral Tarrant (Fredric March), a trenchant Cold Warrior, tries to persuade the 
reluctant hero Lieutenant Harry Brubaker (William Holden) why this war 
is worth fighting for:
 
TARRANT: You don’t quit, and go on doing your job because you’re here. It’s just as 
simple as that. Son, whatever progress this world has made, it’s always been because of 
the efforts and sacrifices of a few. […] Nobody ever knows why he gets the dirty job, and 
this is a dirty job. Militarily, this war is a tragedy. 
BRUBAKER: I think we ought to pull out. 
TARRANT: That’s rubbish, son, and you know it. If we did, they’d take Japan, Indo-
china, the Philippines. Where would you have us make our stand, at the Mississippi? 
All through history, men have had to fight the wrong war in the wrong place, but that’s 
the one they’re stuck with. That’s why one of these days we’ll knock out those bridges 
at Toko-ri.
Tarrant’s speech on the domino theory completes the political structuring of 
the cold war enemy as communist Russia, expansionist in planetary mag-
nitude. Against such a transcendental and omnipotent enemy, the cold war 
liberal hero has no other choice but the “higher freedom” of self-conscious 
submission because in the given terms of choice, it is simply not possible to 
choose transcendental “evil.” The generalized enemy is reduced into “those 
bridges at Toko-ri” to be destroyed/contained, desymbolized into the ob-
ject of a cinematic spectacle of bombing raids. In this theatrical space of 
the endless circular movement, what gets denied is the inherent lack—the 
“real” problems of the war. Also eclipsed are “real” bridges where hundreds 
of civilian refugees were massacred by the allied forces for the alleged fear 
of enemies in ambush; and bridges in North Korea which were leveled “off 
the map” in US bombing raids during the war.35
35 Some of the most well-known sites of civilian massacres would be No Gun Ri bridges where hundreds 
of civilian refugees—mostly women, children, and old men were killed by U.S. forces in July 1950, and 
the ones in North Gyeongsang Province jammed with civilian refugees over whom U.S. warplanes strafed 
under the command of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea to stop all civilian refugees from crossing the lines 
because there might be hiding “enemies” in ambush. The “military” targets of U.S. bombing raids included 
North Korean cities such as Pyeongyang, Sinuiju and Wonsan, as well as “strategic bridges,” which often 
meant irrigation dams providing water for 75% of the North’s food production. See Charles J. Hanley, 
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If containment was a strategy of disciplining the Enemy/Other, integra-
tion politics was a process of regulating “free world” subjects by winning 
their hearts and minds. Integration primarily concerned the attempts to co-
opt the non-Western others, both foreign and domestic, into the postwar 
liberal capitalist world system. To win their hearts, the United States tried 
to distance itself from earlier European imperialism and presented its power 
as “non-imperial” and in fact “benevolent,” as simply helping the newly 
liberated help themselves on the teleological path of economic progress.36 
In this sense, integration was a cold war adaptation of American excep-
tionalism, projecting US imperial practices as exceptions to its proposed 
self-image. In Korean War films, the object of integration is embodied as 
Koreans, Japanese Americans and African Americans, representing third-
world/racial others to be adopted into liberal/American subjectivity. 
If not reified as the Enemy, Koreans are otherwise represented as war 
orphans, women or military “pupils,” who would “reciprocate” Americans’ 
generous “gifts” from Hershey’s chocolate to military aid by providing 
“native” services as child protégés and “nurturing natives” for American 
heroes. Orphaned children are exemplary objects of integration, portrayed 
either as metaphoric sons/pupils to be adopted by the heroes or as spec-
tacles of sentimentality to win the sympathies of the audience. Short Round 
from The Steel Helmet is a faithful disciple of the American hero, eager for 
the patron’s affection and admission to his world. He writes prayers to Bud-
dha, wishing: “Please make Sergeant Zack like me,” and he demands “dog 
tags” from Zack, desiring identity and recognition from the new Father. 
Chu, another orphaned boy attached to Dean Hess, the hero of Battle Hymn, 
literally calls him “abeoji” or “father.” These children are also staged to 
represent Korean people as docile and resigned, offering themselves as a 
spectacle for the sympathies of Americans. For example, Short Round sings 
the Korean national anthem to the sad tune of Auld Lang Syne, soliciting a 
solemn moment of silence from the stunned American men. Also dozens of 
Korean War orphans, playing themselves in Battle Hymn, provide melodra-
Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean 
War (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2001); Kim Dong-choon, “Forgotten War, Forgotten Massacres: The 
Korean War (1950-1953) as Licensed Mass Killings,” Journal of Genocide Research 6.4 (2004): 530; and 
Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History(New York: Norton, 1997), 292-96. 
36 For the U.S.-led postwar development of the free market economic system, see McCormick 1-124; and 
regarding the discourse of “benevolent supremacy,” see McAlister 43-63.
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matic spectacles by digging garbage cans, picking breadcrumbs on the dirt, 
and even performing “Arirang,” a traditional folk song and dance, for their 
white father. Implicitly, the United States is offering “imperial tutelage” un-
der which newly liberated nations should be chaperoned out of the alleged 
“colonial nonage” to the mature/capitalist economy.37
Korea also served as a theater to stage cold war reconstitution of Ameri-
can nationality by integrating its racial others, most notably Japanese and 
African Americans. Japanese Americans are frequently featured as expe-
rienced veterans in equal partnership with the white hero, a reference to 
their transition from wartime enemy to postwar ally, from “yellow peril” 
to “model minority.” Both in The Steel Helmet and Pork Chop Hill, Japa-
nese American characters Tanaka and Ohashi are treated with respect for 
their experience and accepted as friends/partners of white heroes. African 
Americans also take the center stage, reflecting the de facto racial deseg-
regation in the army during the Korean War as well as the dawning civil 
rights movement in the 1950s.38 In Pork Chop Hill, Lieutenant Clemons 
(Gregory Peck) is in fact given a double duty—one to secure a hill from 
the Chinese army and the other to persuade his reluctant African American 
soldier Franklin (Woody Strode) to join the sure-to-lose last stand battle in 
return for a right to join a “pretty exclusive club” of US nationality:
Chances are you’re gonna die, like it or not. So am I, whether you shoot me or not. At 
least we’ve got a chance to do it in pretty good company. A lot of them came up here last 
night. They don’t care any more about Korea than you do. A lot of ‘em had it just as rough 
at home as you did. But they came up and fought. There’s about 25 of them left. It’s a 
pretty exclusive club, but you can still join up. If you want to. 
The theme of racial integration evolves to become the central axis of the 
plot in All the Young Men, where the black man is now elevated to the posi-
tion of a platoon leader and the racial tension between him and his mostly 
white men is rather too blatantly resolved by having him literally trans-
fuse his “blood” to his wounded white nemesis. These racial others are pre-
sented as staunch American subjects, willing to ignore the gaps in national 
37 Medovoi 11.
38 Pressed both from internal demands for desegregation and from a scrutinizing eye of the international 
community, and largely because of desperate personnel shortages, the U.S. army was racially desegregated 
in a meaningful sense during the Korean War. See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the 
Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000), 86-88. 
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identity or the historical mistreatments they suffered. Although the North 
Korean POW in The Steel Helmet attempts to persuade or “brainwash”39 
Tanaka and Thompson, an African American medic, to defect by remind-
ing them of Japanese American internments and Jim Crow laws, the two 
remain unwavering as if testifying that such historical inconsistencies were 
in fact just exceptions to American exceptionalism. 
Thus the making of cold war American subjectivity was premised upon 
such dual politics of containing and simultaneously integrating national 
others, claiming as a result American “innocence” and “purity” of inten-
tion. More specifically, it relied on the liberal principle of “reciprocity,” the 
modern concept of political/economic mutuality, according to which “lib-
eration” enters as a “gift” simultaneously incurring “indebtedness” on the 
part of “the liberated.”40 In this symbolic economy of gift and debt, violence 
is legitimated as “accidental,” as an inevitable price to pay for “liberation 
and rehabilitation,”41 and as a consequent, the American subject is insisted 
as “benevolent,” US imperialist interventions as “exceptions,” and the capi-
talist rationalization of political-economic hierarchization among nations as 
“reciprocal” relations. 
Such liberal American subjects, “innocent, well-intentioned, and benev-
olent,” often find apt illustrations in the heroes of Korean War films. Harry 
Brubaker from The Bridges at Toko-ri is not so much a militant cold war-
rior as a bourgeois civilian, an “innocent” family man and hard-working 
middle-class citizen. A lawyer from Denver and reluctant carrier pilot, he 
is “bitter” because he was called up again from his reserve service and had 
to give up his “home,” his “law practice, everything.” Like Harry, Dean 
Hess (Rock Hudson) from Battle Hymn is another liberal subject, a veteran 
bomber pilot and a pastor. He comes to Korea as an escape from his guilt 
of having killed 37 children on a bombing raid over Germany. His guilt, a 
“debt” to those he killed in the previous war, is then the primary reason for 
39 Although the POW-question was one of the most controversial issues concerning the Korean War, it is 
rather irrelevant to the subject of this paper, thus not discussed here. I dealt with the POW-issue elsewhere 
in a detailed study on The Manchurian Candidate and its 2004 remake. See Junghyun Hwang, “From the 
End of History to Nostalgia: The Manchurian Candidate, Then and Now,” The Journal of Transnational 
American Studies 2.1 (2010): online. <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2qt9w2hh>
40 Saidiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1997), 131. 
41 Lisa Yoneyama, “Traveling Memories, Contagious Justice: Americanization of Japanese War Crimes at the 
End of the Post-Cold War,” Journal of Asian American Studies 6.1 (2003): 80.
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his saving children in the present one, and it is his guilt-debt, the “central 
tragedy and scandal” of his failure to reciprocate, that is, to make payment 
for his sin, which provides the basis for his “claim” upon the orphans he 
“saves.”42 Recast as a spiritual journey of an American bourgeois subject’s 
self-redemption, the story of war orphans ends up no more than a back-
ground to the myth of reciprocity by equating the hero’s “debt-guilt” with 
his right to claim ownership and self-redemption.
These heroes also resemble cold war subjects of drive, making them-
selves chosen and exercising higher freedom of self-conscious submission. 
If Admiral Tarrant in The Bridges at Toko-ri represents the “seeing-man,” 
the desiring cold war subject “whose imperial eyes passively look out and 
possess,”43 Brubaker is making himself seen and chosen by Tarrant, whose 
watchful eye is omnipresent like God’s as his radio code name “Jehovah”44 
connotes. Faced with imminent death towards the end, Brubaker turns a 
non-choice into a choice and finally embraces the inevitable fate of having 
to fight as his willful choice of submission: “The wrong war in the wrong 
place. That’s the one you’re stuck with. […] You fight simply because 
you’re here.” By “making himself chosen” and presenting his participation 
in the war as a conscious individual’s choice of the inevitable, he seeks to 
exempt himself and by extension, US involvement in the war, from any al-
legations of imperialism, claiming his innocence and at the same time the 
exceptional national identity. 
Similarly, Dean Hess in Battle Hymn places himself in the position of 
“being seen” by racial/national others, eliciting an absolution of his guilt 
and an endorsement of his planetary project. Although Hess tries to console 
Maples (James Edwards), an African American pilot, who agonizes over 
having accidentally bombed a truck full of civilian refugees, his position 
is reversed from “seeing” to “being seen” as it is rather Maples that ends 
up consoling and redeeming Hess of his guilt over having killed German 
orphans: “Sir, it’s the way of things, I guess. I figure it’s all God’s making 
and will.” Hess also puts himself in the position of being seen by Lu Wan 
(Philip Ahn), an elderly Korean savant in the exotic traditional costume: 
42 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992), 97.
43 Pratt 7.
44 Rick Worland, “The Korean War Film as Family Melodrama: ‘The Bridges at Toko-Ri’ (1954),” Historical 
Journal of Film, Radio and Television 19.3 (1999): 364. 
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Yes, war is evil. […] In times like these, can a man of good conscience ask others, ‘Pro-
tect me. Kill for me. But do not ask me to stain my hands’? What must one do when a 
choice between two evils is all that is offered? To accept the lesser sometimes can be our 
only choice. In order to save, at times we must destroy, and in destruction, create new 
life. (italics added)
By equating “seeing” and “being seen” as a reciprocal relation and making 
himself seen by his national/racial others, he posits that he is innocent of 
malice, that violence is accidental, even inevitable, for the sake of libera-
tion/progress—merely an exception to the rule of American exceptional-
ism. 
These men prefigure the coming subject of drive, trapped in the self-
enclosed loop of rationalization. By turning a non-choice to a choice, 
Brubaker claims his subjectivity; yet simultaneously presenting the choice 
he makes as fate, he relieves himself from any responsibility. Hess inverts 
his subjective position by making himself seen by the Other, but he reas-
serts his authority/subjectivity by having the Other speak on behalf of him 
and present his act of choice as the ineluctable force of teleology. For them, 
the gap constituting subjectivity is closed, and they look satisfied with the 
self-enclosed movement of reasoning, which finally frees them from infi-
nite striving for meaning. In Fixed Bayonets, Rock (Gene Evans), another 
veteran sergeant like Zack, heralds a new era of professional soldiering: 
“What makes a guy stay in the army? I wish I knew the answer. […] Maybe 
it’s something that just happens to you” (italics added). He chooses to fight 
war because he makes himself chosen by some ineluctable external force—
a soldier invested in the autistic force of drive with no destination, finding 
nevertheless “a perverted pleasure provided by the very painful experience 
of repeatedly missing one’s goal.”45 Like someone from Zack’s platoon 
says, they are “going around in circles,” lost in the thick fog of war. 
Epilogue: The Angel of History in the Desert Storm
The Hurt Locker, Kathryn Bigelow’s 2008 film about the Iraq War, is about 
a man’s addiction to war. Following the epigraph: “The rush of battle is a 
potent and lethal addiction, for war is a drug,”46 the film depicts the dra-
45 Žižek, Ticklish Subject 360. 
46 This quote is taken from reporter Chris Hedges, War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2003). 
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matic life of a soldier and bomb technician Will James (Jeremy Renner), the 
leader of a three-man bomb squad in 2004 Iraq. He seems to embody the 
usual attributes of heroism: he is dauntless, tenacious, fierce yet convivial 
and compassionate, and above all profoundly skilled at dismantling home-
made bombs or IEDs (improvised explosive devices). But he turns out to 
enjoy just a little too much the act of defusing the bombs itself to the point 
that he seems completely unconcerned about the cause of his fighting or 
about the circumstances of the war. 
Nevertheless, he appears attached to an Iraqi boy called “Beckham,” 
hanging out near the military camp and peddling pornographic DVDs. His 
affection seems genuine when he, believing the boy has been murdered, 
risks his life to venture singlehandedly into a dangerous Iraqi neighbor-
hood. But when the hero later encounters Beckham alive and well, he takes 
no account of him. The boy has been for him just another alibi to stoke his 
addiction, “an excuse for indulging his taste for danger.”47 This episode is 
“a holographic miniature”48 of the film that is not really about the Iraq War. 
The Iraqi people are always situated on the fringes of the main action as 
bystanders on the streets and onlookers from balconies possibly hiding po-
tential bombers—a butcher with cell phone as detonator, a man with a video 
camera maybe exchanging signals with men on a minaret, a man walking 
down a flight of stairs and disappearing down an alley, a taxi driver mutely 
refusing to leave the bomb site, all to no apparent meaning—and as snipers 
with their draped backs to the camera and closed-up eyes staring through 
cross-hairs. They are just part of the background, dematerialized specters 
inhabiting “the desymbolized wasteland that is Baghdad”49—the general-
ized Enemy threatening to rupture the screen. 
The cold war subject of the Korean War, caught in the circular move-
ment of finding-while-missing the meaning, is refigured here in Iraq as a 
postmodern subject of drive transcending the lack and finding satisfaction 
in the circular movement with no destination. This circular rationality was 
constructed in the early years of the cold war as illustrated by Hollywood 
films about Korea. It is almost uncanny to witness how the generic conven-
tions of the Korean War film are replicated in this movie about Iraq. For 
47 Richard Alleva, “War as Narcotic,” Commonweal Sept. 11, 2009: 25. 
48 Joshua Clover, “Allegory Bomb,” Film Quarterly 63.2(Winter 2009/2010): 9.
49 David Denny, “On the Politics of Enjoyment: A Reading of The Hurt Locker,” Theory & Event 14.1 (2011): 
n.p.
80 American Studies in Scandinavia, 49:1
example, the typical Korean War hero—cynical about the meaning of fight-
ing, yet seasoned veteran in the battlefield—is a precursor to nonchalant 
but profoundly professional Will James. Beckham, an Iraqi boy attached to 
James, is a familiar figure in Hollywood war films, yet he originates from 
Short Round, a Korean orphan that tags along the gruff hero Sergeant Zack 
in The Steel Helmet. Not only that, but the use of civilians, walking the thin 
line between harmless bystanders and masquerading insurgents, also began 
in Korean War films with communist guerrillas in civilian disguise blurring 
the friend/enemy divide, or rather all bundled up as the inscrutable Enemy/
Other, just as someone from The Hurt Locker mutters, “They all look the 
same to me.” 
The similarities between the two wars go beyond such cinematic conven-
tions. Just as the “nonwar” definition enabled the American participation 
in the Korean War, the United States invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003 by 
declaring that it was not so much a war between sovereign nations as a 
police action against illegal terrorists. As the initial celebration of Korea 
as a moral crusade turned soon into ugly guerrilla warfare, the supposedly 
“good” war to spread “freedom and democracy” almost immediately turned 
into a “quagmire” of Iraqi sands where the demarcations between civilians 
and insurgents proved extremely tenuous, and America’s claim to “liberate” 
Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship was criticized as nothing 
but a thinly veiled excuse for its interests in natural resources and political 
influence in the region.
Just as the Korean War was crucial for the formation and development 
of the cold war, setting out the contours of a post-World War II world or-
der, the recent wars in the Middle East have been the central playground in 
shaping a “new world order,” as George H. W. Bush claimed in 1990,50 out 
of the shifting post-cold war dynamics of power. The end of the cold war 
was hailed as the dawning of a new world order—an era of globalization 
which would supposedly bring together divergent cultures into a harmoni-
ous whole. And this singular world would assume a capitalist and demo-
cratic system, whose model is to be American. “Globalization is the United 
States,” as Thomas Friedman proudly declared in neo-Wilsonian spirit.51
50 According to Giles Gunn, the senior Bush used the phrase in a speech delivered to a joint session of Con-
gress on September 11, 1990, immediately following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait the preceding 
month, which he titled “Toward a New World Order.” Gunn 12.
51 Quoted in Steel 28. Francis Fukuyama’s End of History and the Last Man is one of the most well-known 
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Although The Hurt Locker received six Oscars including best picture 
and near universal acclaim as the first serious film about the Iraq War, it 
is criticized for failing to question the real conditions of the war.52 What 
captivates the audience is something other than the “real” of war. Rather 
it is the rush of anxious suspension and drama—in short, “the spectacu-
lar effect of the Real.”53 The gritty “reality” of Baghdad captured by the 
documentary-style hand held camera is the semblance of the effect of “real” 
war—“decaffeinated so that I might come down from my high and get a 
good night sleep.”54 The movie operates in a kind of closed loop where 
“experience is finally about nothing but itself,”55 generating the sense of 
thrill in the very circular movement without ever reaching the goal or the 
“real” of the war. As David Denny argues, the film is fascinating because it 
resonates with “contemporary western culture” as well as “a certain modal-
ity of subjectivity”—namely, the hero Will James represents the postmod-
ern subject of drive that is caught in the circular movement of repeatedly 
missing its desired object, but nevertheless finds satisfaction in the endless 
circling itself. And this subject of drive epitomizes the subject of consumer 
capitalism, “endlessly [circling] around and [gaining] satisfaction by way 
of the impossible objects and simulacra of consumption”; simultaneously, 
he is the subject of American new imperialism because the only way to fight 
the interminable war on terror is with “soldiers fully invested in the autistic, 
pulsating force of a drive that has no destination.”56 
The cold war subject, going around in circles in the Forgotten War, seems 
to have come full circle in the storm of the Iraqi desert. In making himself 
chosen or exercising higher freedom of willful submission, the cold war 
subject seemed to retain the semblance of self-consciousness in his cyni-
cism about pervert reasoning. For the post-cold war/postmodern subject 
like James, there is no sarcasm, no sense of rupture. He is the “living em-
commentaries that hailed the collapse of communism as the end of History and liberal capitalism as the 
only viable system. 
52 A number of critics have expressed reservations about the film’s stance towards the Iraq War, calling it 
“apolitical,” “evasive,” and even downright “pro-war.” See Clover, Denny, and a few others such as: A. 
O. Scott, “Soldiers on a Live Wire Between Peril and Protocol,” The New York Times June 25, 2009; Carla 
Seaquist, “The Hurt Locker: Hollywood’s Unsettling View of the Iraq War,” The Christian Science Monitor 
29 Mar 2010: 20; Robert Sklar, “Film Reviews: The Hurt Locker,” Cineaste (Winter 2009): 55-56. 
53 Žižek, Welcome to the Desert 10. 
54 Denny, n.p. 
55 Clover 9. 
56  Denny, n.p.
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bodiment of post-traumatic stress disorder,” but he is “treated by the film 
as not disordered at all.”57 Severed from the signifying field of social mean-
ings and floating in the eternal present, James has just “forgotten how to 
be its victim, and thus becomes a poster-boy of the Iraq war generation.”58 
Perhaps it is about time that we face, with the angel of history, “one single 
catastrophe” rather than “a chain of events,” which hurls the pile of debris 
at us from the past.59
The true choice is not the one between remembering and forgetting be-
cause traumas when not properly remembered are not simply erased, but 
their traces will haunt us into the present. They constitute the Real Thing 
that guarantees the consistency of our symbolic façade, but their fantas-
matic specters simultaneously constitute the inconsistency of the symbolic 
itself. Naming the Korean War as “a forgotten war” not so much effaces 
the war’s existence as it evokes its continuing presence in the form of a 
suppressed historical knowledge. Similarly, naming of the 9/11 bomb sites 
as Ground Zero recovers the memories of US bombings over Dresden, To-
kyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and numerous other places including North Ko-
rean cities as well as Baghdad—evoking “the specter of nation-founding 
violence out of whose exclusion the fantasy of the Virgin Land had been 
organized.”60 The true choice we have to consider is not between remem-
bering and forgetting or between “existence” and “nonexistence.” For the 
“opposite of existence is not nonexistence,” as Žižek aptly sums up, “but 
insistence: that which does not exist, continues to insist, striving towards 
existence.”61 In order to truly forget, we must first summon up the courage 
to remember properly. 
57 Barker 157. 
58 Ibid.
59 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1968), 257.
60 Pease, New American Exceptionalism 162.
61 Žižek, Welcome to the Desert 22. 
